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Introduction: Transgressions or, beyond the Obvious 
 
I  Recognitions and Misrecognitions 
 
Transgression: it is a common enough word, circulated enough for us all to believe we 
understand what is meant by it when it is used. Ideas about what constitutes transgression are 
equally commonplace. Transgression, we might say, goes without saying. Yet, is that in fact the 
case? Or is it not that we are so used to what we take to be the idea of transgression that we 
have, in all truth, forgotten, or not even become aware of the extent to which transgression 
constitutes our identities? Believing we understand the term as indicative of breaking a law, 
doing something illicit, disrupting order and rebelling against societal norms, if and when we 
think we transgress we do no more than conform to expectations of acceptable ‘deviance’. We 
act up in a manner already in some sense prescribed, whether socially or historically, and so 
merely conform in a way that is more or less tolerated, even when excoriated. 
 Transgression however runs much deeper than that. It is, as I shall argue in the present 
volume, not merely the breaking of a code, a rebellion against normative social or cultural 
constraints; rather it is the very pulse that constitutes our identities, and we would have no 
sense of our own subjectivity were it not for a constant, if discontinuous negotiation with the 
transgressive otherness by which we are formed and informed. Identity must needs believe in 
its own stability for the conventions of transgression to apply. However, ‘for a subject to 
imagine itself as having a stable identity’, remarks Elisabeth Bronfen, is always an act of mis-
recognition (mésconnaissance), a fiction, an illusion…’. She continues, ‘though language allows 
for a differentiation between self and Other… this differentiation is never complete and the 
imaginary register never disappears … In a sense any image is the death because the negation of 
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the thing, for it signifies that something was thought or recognised, not as real but as an image’ 
(Elisabeth Bronfen 1992, 395) 
 Seeing oneself as having a stable identity is, then, to misrecognize one’s selfhood. It is 
to project an image and take that simulacrum as the reality, as Bronfen suggests. From this 
basis of misunderstanding or, to anticipate the next citation, from this ‘mode of production’ 
that generates the social structure we call the self, the subject or identity, it is an all too easy 
step to imagine the self negated, the subject beyond the law, situated, and situating itself, in a 
locus of negativity, opposition, and transgressive rebellion. This leads to the following 
question. ‘If’, asks Julia Kristeva, ‘ in certain modes of production, social structure projects 
itself…by circumscribing a represented, assumed, encased negativity…how does this closed place 
function generally, logically, outside the … system?’ (97). Kristeva’s inscription of precise 
location, of an inside and an outside in the definition of proscribed or outlaw act or event is 
instructive. It comments on the coercive nature of modes of production that are shaped by 
historical, cultural and ideological forces, which are themselves not stable but which shift 
endlessly, in order that a ‘social structure’ such as the subject might be incorporated in the 
mode of production, (mis)recognised as a product of that mode, or otherwise placed outside, 
expelled or marginalised. Identifying illicit practice, determined as a negativity in relation to, 
and yet closed off from the social structure, Kristeva defines in part at least the transgressive 
subject produced as a historical subject and determined through the reading of a transgressive 
space or locus. Her description of spatial position, of clearly defined positions based on 
perceivable oppositions such as I have indicated, is far from uncommon in the thinking of 
transgressive events.  
However, as valuable a starting point as it may be, Kristeva’s reading does not take into 
account sufficiently the endless differentiation implied in Elisabeth Bronfen’s argument, and 
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so presents through its critique a kind of misunderstanding that is socially pervasive, in as 
much as Kristeva reinscribes the static structural relations of the binary opposition that informs 
so much thinking on the transgressive (self/other, inside/outside, and so on). It thus 
illuminates the fact that we think in somewhat obvious ways about transgression, when we 
think of it. Keeping it away from ourselves, we speak of the transgressive as beyond the law, 
beyond the everyday. We site it as a counter-law in its own right. We situate it hygienically and 
economically, in what we like to think of as an enclosed space. Yet, as I shall argue, such 
understanding is misunderstanding; and such representation of what we think of as 
transgression is misrepresentation. Thinking the transgressive in mundane or quotidian ways 
involves the invocation of a static need to separate, to include and exclude, and so to draw 
limits or borders. And because we misapprehend in this fashion, transgression can happen 
again and again, in countless, surprising eruptions from within the very places that we seek to 
define as safe, controlled and patrolled. 
 
II Conventions of Transgression 
 
Transgression, therefore: the act of breaking a law, committing a crime or sin, doing something 
illegal, or otherwise acting in some manner proscribed by the various forms or institutions of 
Law in societies, whether secular or religious, all of which have histories and which themselves 
are mutable, self-translating. To cross a line, to step across some boundary or move beyond 
convention—this is what it means, to transgress. To stray from the straight and narrow, to 
trespass, to overstep a limit—all such definitions share common assumptions, whether explicitly 
or implicitly. Whether one thinks of breaking civil or moral laws, whether transgression has to 
do with sexuality or another aspect of accepted behaviour, the common assumptions that 
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inform any definition of transgression have to do with (a) form or identity; (b) a movement or 
motion, a passage of some kind, and therefore implicitly a duration or temporality; and this 
passage from being on the side of the law to being lawless, for example, hence tres-pass, to pass 
over or across, to infringe or impose; (c) spatial and relational position or location.  
If I pass or cross a line, if I ‘depart from the straight and narrow’ as the somewhat 
clichéd, old-fashioned phrase has it, the implication is that while I was in one place, now I am 
in another. This is the logic implicit in Kristeva’s argument. These places are not simply 
relational; their relation is not neutral. The erstwhile location from which I have departed is, in 
the context of thinking transgression, always on the side of the law, convention, what is taken 
socially and culturally, as well as institutionally, to be standard, acceptable, decent, proper, 
correct, approved or authorized. The present location in which I find myself, in which I have 
placed myself by my own activity, this is the place of the illicit, the outlaw. This is what 
transgression means: to step over or beyond a limit or boundary, to cross a threshold, to move 
beyond the commonly determined bounds (of law, decency, or whatever).  
A word more is necessary on the first of the constituent elements of transgression. As 
we shall have occasion to consider, form and identity are interrelated, particularly in the sense 
that the form of a literary text serves to inform the reader about a character’s identity, while the 
transgressive actions or attitudes of a character can frequently be worked out not through the 
character’s identity solely but also in the form (or let us call it ‘identity’) of the literary text in 
question. For now however, it simply remains to remind ourselves of those three aspects of 
transgression, to which we will return shortly: identity/form, movement/passage/temporality, 
and space/location. 
 What should be clear so far though is that in order for there to be transgression there 
has to be a law of some sort, there must be axioms by which an institution—society, a 
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university, a religious sect or faith—assert, define, and qualifies its identity and limits. These 
statements of purpose and self-identification are designed in a double fashion. On the one 
hand, they take on the inevitable quality of self-evident truths, as if the institution in question, 
rather than constantly defining and redefining its form and identity, were simply making 
explicit what was already natural, inevitable or common-sensically obvious. The logic of their 
existence is somewhat circular therefore. On the other hand, such statements, rules, or 
commandments are produced, amended and supplemented, in order that members or 
potential members of whatever the institution in question can measure the extent to which 
they belong, how they might belong, to what extent they are excluded or can never belong. 
 
III Clearing the Ground 
 
This is to speak only of how one becomes defined by others as having acted transgressively. 
Transgression, conventionally understood, can be taken on also as a deliberate act of defiance, 
non-acceptance of laws, or rebellion. Transgressive art might be understood as that which sets 
out consciously to flaunt social and cultural mores, to violate convention, to repulse or to 
offend. At its most crude, transgressive art and transgression generally are simply those events, 
practices, or works that set out to shock. To speak critically of transgression is to authorize 
oneself to address ‘ritual, carnival, art, culture and madness’ (Jenks 2000, 3). Extending and 
adding detail to this broad brush depiction, we might acknowledge the following at least: 
nudity, sex and sexual preferences or gender orientation, so-called sexually deviant acts (water-
sports, fisting, and so on), swearing; extending our list, we can include slasher movies, snuff 
movies, horror-porno, punk, Kenneth Tynan saying ‘fuck’ on the BBC in the mid-1960s, satire, 
Monty Python’s The Life of Brian, blasphemy, tattooing or body-piercing and other 
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manifestations of body-art; stepping back before the present day, we can include referring to 
God in 16th- and 17th-century plays, Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus (a play in which, as one 
student recently described it to me, Shakespeare got ‘a bit carried away’), the writings of the 
Marquis de Sade, Goethe’s Elective Affinities, ‘posing as a sodomite’ in the words of the charges 
levelled against Oscar Wilde; coming back to the twentieth century, we can point to Dada, 
Surrealism, transgressive literature such as the work of Kathy Acker or American Psycho by Brett 
Easton Ellis, Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club or Crash by J. G. Ballard, the photography of Robert 
Mapplethorpe, Andres Serrano’s Piss Christ… 
 So far, so obvious, you might say (and so would I). If this were all to transgression—as 
many take there to be—then I could stop writing here, say no more about the subject, call it a 
day, and hope that the publisher would print and sell the 2-3 pages I’ve written up to this 
point. The End. That would be something, wouldn’t it? A book, which from the outside 
looked relatively normal, having a cover with a title and author, appearing to be of average 
width (around 160-200 pages, let’s say), but which, when you opened it, had nothing on its 
pages beyond the first 1000 or so words. Had you paid for such a thing you might feel cheated, 
you might believe that some convention or tacit understanding or agreement between writer, 
publisher, bookstore and reader had been, well, transgressed. Or you might just think it a cheap 
trick, worth neither the price of admission nor the paper on which the meagre offering was 
published. But then again you might think that here was proof that at last you could judge a 
book by its cover. 
 And this raises a more serious, if simultaneously, absolutely shallow point: if a book 
calls itself Transgression or transgressions, do you expect the book to behave in a completely 
conventional manner? Do you want it to tell you all about transgressions, and all the while 
present you with an image rather than a reality? Would you want that book to tell you 
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authoritatively, and from the side of those modes of production or structuring laws about 
transgression as though it were outside such acts? Or would you expect it in some manner to 
engage in transgressions, however minor, performing rather than addressing its topic with a 
phoney objectivity? Even were you to come to a book on transgression without either set of 
expectations—which would, in all probability mean that, unthinkingly you were already placed 
as a subject in a position of thinking that a book of literary criticism should ‘simply’ describe 
and define from ‘outside’ its subject, so to speak—would it not be at least minimally interesting 
to find yourself in the midst of a project that attempts to clear the ground of the conventional, 
silently rethinking the transgressive from within, and adopting different positions and different 
voices, in order, once more, to transgress, however slightly? 
 This is what I am seeking to do throughout the present volume. It is, in no small 
measure, why for some readers there might appear to be no real continuity, no real coverage of 
the subject in any really historical way.i What might appear as the jumpiness, the arbitrariness, 
the picky and patchy idiosyncrasies of this volume is, in fact, a double gesture. On the one 
hand, without offering either an overarching historical contextualisation, I move from the early 
modern period to different manifestations and translations of modernity, and from thence to 
particular critical-theoretical voices. In each example I choose, the production, projection, 
placement and disruption of subjectivities is a central concern: how are identities formed and 
how do they come either to be read or to articulate themselves, whether through recognition or 
misrecognition? And how, moreover do such gestures of self-fashioning (as it is called in the 
first chapter) involve a necessary transgression, a breaking of boundaries, a stepping across the 
line? Such questions motivate the various chapters, and where I alight on a form, a critical 
voice, a single text or a group of texts, I do so because, implicit to my reading is the assumption 
that the transgressions with which I am concerned figure themselves with an idiocultural—
8 
historical and material—specificity that is, in the texts in question, particularly acute. On the 
other hand, I address the different texts I approach in what might, from certain perspectives 
appear to be a range of ‘voices’ or ‘styles’. I move between different topics and areas of focus 
and examine those texts from within their structures, through acts of close reading, several of 
which are ‘wire-drawn’, as a somewhat obscure, but rather elegant term has it (meaning drawn 
out to great length, fine spun, elaborately subtleii), because while transgression surfaces it is 
recognised only over time, across the space of a text, and within structures and conventions of 
identity. It might well be asked why this double motion, why the broad historical range without 
explanation and the overly detailed, fussy frippery of too-close reading; and, furthermore, why 
the mixture of critical styles, the more or less straightforward literary analysis (as in the example 
of Spenser), the more or less regular literary-historical methodology of the discussion of the 
Gothic, and the more or less dialogic model of interpolated dialogues in the final chapter on 
Giorgio Agamben?  
Each of these points warrants a response, and the response returns us to my earlier 
questions concerning what kind of a book this should be: one that constitutes a constative 
speech act, that is one which simply talks, as if from the outside or the supposition that there 
can be an ‘outside’, of its subject; or one which tries to show, instead of merely telling, one 
which is a performative act; that is to say a book which is comprised of numerous little acts of 
transgression, the different style here, the different voice there, the refusal to conform to 
certain standards, albeit standards, conventions or institutions that are hinted at everywhere. 
At its simplest, transgression is after all a ‘goyyng fro the ryht way’, as Lydgate puts it, in the 
OED’s earliest example (from 1426). There is the work of the more or less, that trope insistently 
reiterated above, and a trope, I have to say, which in its repetition illustrates the extent to 
which something appears either to take place, almost, or otherwise over-eggs the critical 
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pudding. It is a question of seeking repeatedly to go from the right way, departing from 
convention—and of course, in doing so, affirming that there is no right way, no straightforward 
approach. My small, mostly technical irritants are intended to overstep the line and limit of 
what is properly thought a critical overview of a conceptual model, and are effected in order to 
discomfort or disorientate the reader, to transgress the reader’s certainties, his or her 
knowingness on so common a topic. 
Thus regarding the question of the historical, one of my implicit contentions—and 
doubtless this will be, for some, quite contentious if not, in fact specious—is as follows: whilst it 
can be argued that all manifestations of transgression are marked by their own singular 
historicity (the conditions by which the form of transgression is shaped and so gives expression 
in a singular fashion), it cannot be said that there is any real continuity. If one takes the 
position—or positions—that I do, that there is no single definable concept of transgression (and 
this is already implicit in what I have said above about the conventions of reading 
transgression) because the very idea of transgression being irreducible to conceptualisation 
inasmuch as it is endlessly self-differentiating and protean, auto-heterogeneous, then there can 
be no real continuity, and subsequently, no real coverage of the subject in a really historical way. 
All one would end up doing in trying to produce a single, continuous narrative grounded in 
history would be to seek out those instances or events of transgression that look like one 
another, which have a family resemblance in fact.  
And so you would end up with a book examining, let’s say for argument’s sake, sex and 
sexuality in Shakespeare, sex and sexuality in the eighteenth century, sex and sexuality in the 
nineteenth-century, and so on. Despite the careful, real scholarship involved in such a work—
looking at source documents, dating examples, providing a context of the cultural 
temperament or temperature of the times—continuity would seek, deliberately or otherwise, to 
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erase difference, singularity, divergence, and so erase in part or in toto the very historicity that 
traces the examples of transgressions, which a real history, whether in terms of old historicism 
or some newer, quasi- or post-Foucauldian historicism would generate. Indeed, on the back of 
this I would have to ask what is a ‘really historical way’? Is not the very idea—tied so seamlessly 
to the notion of continuity and the insistence on the ‘real’, which I have imagined above as the 
argument of a fictional critic of this project—of a ‘really historical way’ one which seeks to 
subordinate its subject to a governable mode of inquiry, as I have just intimated? (It’s a little 
like those critics who insist that while George Eliot is properly historical as a novelist, Charles 
Dickens, because of his fondness for sentiment and melodrama is not. This fails to appreciate 
or even begin to read that melodrama, or indeed any other mode of representation, is, to put it 
simply, just a different code, shot through by the traces of an encrypted historicism.) 
My argument, put as baldly as possible, is that transgressions, being many, multiple, 
and endlessly inventive and self-differentiating, avoid such determinations, such laws of order, 
logic and narrative. Moreover, they cannot be examined from the outside, for the very reason 
that they are of the very fabric of the historical, and to isolate them according to a master 
narrative is to fall foul of critical recuperation into the structural conventions already 
acknowledged, and with that the belief that the image is the real. 
This is why, having spent a large part of the present volume with literary examples, 
tracing in the process an historical trajectory, more or less, with regard to publication dates (I 
move from Spenser, through the Restoration and Dryden, onto Gothic novels and the Gothic 
in the nineteenth century, before moving back and forth in the chapter on Venice between the 
Romantics and the late twentieth century), I turn to literary criticism and critical theory. The 
transition is ostensibly abrupt, and so warrants an explanation. 
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If you are reading this book, you are in some way or another engaged in the work of 
criticism, literary or cultural. Reading a book that addresses a concept or quasi-concept such as 
transgression means that you are interested in the act of reading and the assumptions that 
inform not only reading but also writing, in an institutional context such as a university, about 
literature, culture, art, and so on. Reading others’ commentaries on literary works involves one 
in both the practice of criticism and the metacritical discourses that speak about the critical act, 
how one pursues it, what one’s interests are, how one formulates approaches, gives to one’s act 
of reading particular parameters. This is where you start from at least. Turning away from the 
literary historical focus of the previous four chapters, in the following, and final section, of this 
book, I turn therefore to two very different critical texts, which come to you in the names of 
literary critic Harold Bloom and philosopher Giorgio Agamben.  
In the chapter on Bloom, I examine one of his most widely read and influential critical 
works, The Anxiety of Influence. In this chapter, as in that on Agamben, I continue my critical 
reflection on transgression as this informs one’s subjectivity. Sketching a reading of Bloom’s 
theory of the anxiety of influence—the way in which, in order to avoid the undue influence of a 
poet of an earlier generation the poet of a later generation creatively ‘misreads’ his predecessor 
so as to escape such influence—I look at how Bloom’s own critical language is one plagued with 
anxiety. His reading of influence is itself an anxious articulation of a haunted subjectivity, and 
it is in this critical duplication that I take the signs and traces of transgression to be registered, 
and where they leave their marks. As with Venice, Gothic, sovereignty, and self-fashioning, 
identity for the critical voice is always informed, transgressed and translated by, the voices and 
inscriptions of the other, and one’s subjectivity is constituted and reconstituted in a struggle to 
transgress oneself the limits imposed on one’s subjectivity. 
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What comes to one may deform as much as it informs, but such destabilization need 
not be the cause of fear, anxiety, or abjection. Most neutrally perhaps, one’s transgression by 
the other is an experience of ex-stasis. Not simply, or, more accurately, not yet ecstasy—for to 
choose this word would imply an aesthetic or phenomenal value, great joy or frenzy which one 
has already passed through and on which one has reflected, named and given a determination 
to—what I am calling ex-stasis is just the apperception of being moved out of (ex) that illusory, 
often non-reflective sense of equilibrium (stasis) which one associates with one’s ‘normal’ 
subjective state.  In many cases, being moved by another out of oneself, finding oneself 
psychically and emotionally traversed by another, by the trace of another, is to find oneself in 
love and transgressed by love. Love is thus the final name for transgression in this volume, and 
I illustrate and explore its workings not through a romance, a novel or other convenient fiction 
but instead in the philosophical and literary-critical essays of Italian philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben. Agamben’s texts are frequently ‘interrupted’ by the signs of love; and thus his 
publications offer us an analogical model for thinking about love’s transgression, the way in 
which that which is other to system, order or coherent programme, nevertheless takes one by 
surprise, crossing the threshold of one’s identity and, in this motion of transgression, 
translating or transforming the subject, revealing to that subject, the other within oneself, one’s 
very own endlessly transgressive force or play. 
Like anxiety, love is thus seen as a phantasmic or spectral transgression. Yet, I would 
argue, what transgression is not this, if we are to reflect on transgressions beyond the obvious 
and everyday physical or material instances of the commonly understood transgressive, which 
beyond it is the purpose of this book to pursue? Perhaps not a little idiosyncratically, I have 
specifically chosen to very singular critical texts as the subjects with which to conclude the 
present volume, precisely because, on the one hand, every act of reading constitutes a 
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transgression; it crosses the line, you cross the line, the limit, boundary or threshold of a text 
every time you open it, enter it. Conversely, every text enters you, causes you to reflect, to 
think. On the other hand, my concluding subjects have been chosen because, despite their very 
different focus (criticism rather than literature), what they share, however idiomatically, not 
only with one another but also with each of the literary texts I have explored here, is the focus 
on the realm and work of the imaginary in the material formation of subjectivity, and the 
essentially phantasmic role of transgressions in the cultural histories of human identity, in all 
its fluidity. Bloom and Agamben are here simply because, at the same time as they offer 
examples in different discourses of the manner in which subjectivity is fundamentally ‘haunted’ 
(the implicit argument behind the chapters on Gothic and Venice), they foreground, 
deliberately or not, intentionally or otherwise, the extent to which being human means not 
only to be transgressed but also to be transgressive. Subjectivity is always grounded, historically, 
culturally, ideologically, epistemologically, in space and time; being is always a being-in-the-
world, a being-there as Martin Heidegger would have it. But equally, subjectivity is never fixed, 
it is semi-porous, mutable, ineluctably protean, fluctuating, and discontinuously differentiated 
within itselves and its others. Before sin, disobedience, misbehaviour or wrongdoing, 
transgression is always the limitless capacity of the subject to break its own limits and still 
remain itself. 
 
IV Shifting Positions 
 
This might have begun to seem like mere metacritical filigree work. There is a point to this 
though, as the number of subject positions—subject positions by the way that I ‘imagine’ or 
‘invent’ in each of the chapters that follows through the staging of their different voices—I have 
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imagined in the previous section should imply. What is transgressive for one person is not for 
another. Concomitantly, and if you look back over my taxonomy of transgressive examples, 
what is transgressive in one age is not in another. Neither is the transgressive easily or simply 
defined as that which any normative or hegemonic group in a society or institution decide on, 
especially if the artist or writer or another group without power or on the margins of society 
argue that they are not being transgressive. For example, there have been long stretches 
throughout history when same-sex relationships were regarded as unnatural, perverse, deviant, 
against the laws of man (sic) and God; indeed, there still remain large groups of bigots today 
whose homophobia and, often, religious faith, allows them to see homosexuality as 
transgressive.  To turn to literature and art, perhaps Brett Easton Ellis wished to be 
transgressive when he wrote American Psycho. I do not know. But if I did not find it so when I 
read it, and instead merely found it boring, banal, predictable, mundane, obvious, then was it 
transgressive? Equally, Andres Serrano may not have sought to be transgressive, but numbers of 
Christians (not all, it is important to remark) found Piss Christ deeply offensive (even the title of 
the work today will give pause to some, as you read it here). It is important to acknowledge 
then once more that there is no transgression, if by this term one means a stable or constant, 
universal concept, which is transferable from situation to situation, event to occasion, from era 
to era, constituency to constituency. Transgressions, plural, take place but because what is 
transgression for one is affirmation for another, what is the disruption of form or institution 
for some is the assertion of identity for others, the very notion of transgression can never be 
defined as more than an abstract notion understood as the traversal of a boundary, and with 
that motion or passage the deformation of the limits of form, identity or institution 
momentarily or provisionally. In this, we find ourselves back at that line of Lydgate’s from the 
fifteenth century. 
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V Transgressions: Subject, Space and Time 
 
If there are constants, or quasi-constants, these emerge in the present volume as those focal 
points relating the subject’s identity to matters of temporality and space. The ‘place’ where the 
three come together is memory. Memory serves as the figure for speaking of the relation 
between the three ‘topics’ or topoi of this volume—identity, space, and time—as they come to 
touch on one another in our thinking of the constitution and dissolution of the transgressive 
movement or passage. In the sense that transgression is always a motion that disturbs borders 
and the understanding of what is included and excluded by any boundary, that it can be 
argued that memory is transgressive. Why? Well, as a starting point in reorientating ourselves 
to this suggestion, memory, it has to be admitted, can arrive at any time. Equally, unbidden, it 
slips away. In either case, memory is always the movement or passage across a certain limit, 
boundary or margin.  
Like the trace of a phantom, it comes to pass, unbidden, at different times, and with 
different speeds. Memory does not wait for my consciousness to call it up, but can appear, in 
any moment, returning across the threshold. It moves across several thresholds and ‘places’; 
between for example, the unconscious and the conscious mind, between remembering and 
forgetting, and, more subtly, and to give this a temporal dimension that the structural examples 
just alluded to do not acknowledge, memory moves as a recording of the past from the 
moment of its transcription to the moment of its reiteration. In this passage, it crosses the 
boundary not between a past and a present, that is to say the past of an experience or event 
recorded by the mind or the present of that mind’s recollection of the event or experience 
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through the inscribed or recorded trace of the thing itself. Memory thus transgresses a border 
between what is real and what is phantasmatic, between a materiality and the registration of 
that material condition or set of conditions. In this, it bears a relationship with the experience 
of the uncanny, which is to be explored in the third chapter. However, to remain with 
memory’s passage, in this motion, memory is transgressive in another fashion, for in its ‘travel’ 
it undoes any neat distinction between truth and falsity. In being a memory it necessarily 
makes of material and historical experience a narrative, and to the extent that all narrative is an 
ordered account that privileges certain events over others, leaving particular details out whilst 
giving added emphasis to others, narrative, like memory ‘fictionalizes’; it tells a tale in a 
manner that is neither simply true nor false. Indeed, the very categories themselves of truth or 
falsity, real or imagined, are shown to be marked by limits that memory can and does overstep. 
 Now, my example of memory as transgressive immediately problematizes the 
conventional or journalistic wisdom on what constitutes transgression, which relies on a 
conscious or deliberate act. According to the understanding of the way memory can and does 
work on many occasions, it comes and goes without conscious volition. I can be thinking or 
doing one thing (writing this book, reading another, walking, running, watching a movie, 
travelling around a city where I don’t live) but what I think of as ‘my’ memory will disturb me—
pleasantly or otherwise—by bringing to mind an experience to which I am giving no conscious 
consideration. It therefore arrives as some other, which is simultaneously both of me and not 
me. It figures as the trace of another me, of myself as an other. A trace of this other self 
therefore comes to pass for me, as a result, possibly, of some obscure or occluded association 
made in the most indirect manner. Phantasmically, the from over the threshold of 
consciousness the fragment of another’s life arrives to disrupt for a moment the borders of my 
identity, my identity as I apprehend it in a given now. That present identity can reassert itself, 
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the memory having retreated, the instant of transgression being brief. Thus it is we find 
ourselves with those three elements of transition I identified earlier and their non-synonymous 
substitutions, identity (form), passage (movement), and location (space or spacing).  
 
VI Rethinking Transgressions 
 
At the risk of repeating myself, beyond whatever is framed or positioned in this introduction, I 
am not be proposing a theory of transgression any more than I am seeking to construct a 
history of the same. To do so would strive, once more, to institutionalize and make normal the 
very idea. Where I do have recourse to particular theoretical texts, this is so as to illuminate 
and offer a more rigorous reflection on transgression. What follows therefore is a consideration 
of particular reflections on and mediations of the notion of transgression, in order that we can, 
in moving through a few of the necessary founding arguments, open the subject beyond itself, 
and so step beyond the path critical interventions have taken. 
 The transgressive text is not the one that shocks. Not necessarily. It is not a play, film, 
novel, work of art or fiction that represents violent or excessive acts. Nothing is more banal, 
mundane, predictable, and quotidian. Of course, a text may portray such events, or it may 
narrate sexual encounters of various kinds, either in a manner that disturbs or of a kind, which 
for a particular audience are upsetting, outrageous, gratuitous. And yet, these are not 
necessarily transgressive in themselves. What I have in mind in speaking of the transgressive 
text is that form which, playing on all the codes conventionally belonging to what Roland 
Barthes calls the ‘structure or grammar of Narrative’ (1994, 261), effects departures from the 
conventions, and which, additionally, displaces narrative significance to a marginal place, 
locating it as a secondary concern, whilst foregrounding process, space, ‘other texts, other 
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codes…articulated…in terms of society, of History…according to citational’ rather than 
‘determinist paths’ (Barthes 1994, 261). Borrowing from Barthes’ definition of textual analysis, 
I am attempting to present a notion of textual explication, which, whilst grounded in close 
reading, nonetheless resists apprehending textual form as a discrete, contained whole on the 
understanding that a text is already transgressive. It is not defined by the narrative it presents, 
even though narrative is a significant component. Every text is therefore a transgressive text; or 
any text can be read as transgressive in principle. To put this another way, within and other than 
the semantic trajectory or horizon, the ‘unified’ content of a particular textual form, there is to 
be another text which gives access to, and inaugurates various transgressive departures borne 
out of the singular structural manifestation of an otherwise ‘combinative infinity’ (Barthes 
1994, 265). 
 This is the first aspect of reading transgression. It involves a reorientation of the act of 
reading, so that reading, responding to those codes or traces that gesture beyond narrative or 
representational coherence and exceed the limits of the form, becomes, itself transgressive. 
More specifically, the transgressive reading is one that recognises those traces in any text which 
are themselves disruptive of conventional and institutional codes. As Barthes puts it, ‘to 
transgress is both to recognize and to reverse; the object … must be presented and denied at the 
same time’ (1967, 47; emphasis added). The emphasis on recognition points to what is 
embedded within the text, reversal stressing the reader’s active work in the production of the 
text, thereby transgressing the limits of reading after coherence. At the heart of the 
transgressive pulse, there are the signs of practices in writing and other aesthetic phenomena 
encrypted ‘inversions or negations of cultural rules’, as Susan Stewart has argued (1991, 3). The 
teaching of reading has sought to regulate or negate those negations. It has attempted to muffle 
the dissonant oscillations within any textual network. The question of reading transgression 
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involves therefore engaging in a contest over the materiality of the signification and the rights 
of exegesis pertaining thereto. As Susan Stewart has observed of literary production, the law 
‘exists in a distant space’; she continues, [it] is already written, and has written the present’ 
(1991, 21). Despite this, the text exceeds the law that determines its form. It does so not in any 
simple dialectical contest. Instead, with an irony that is sometimes po-faced, sometimes 
hilariously parodic, it imitates the law in what amounts, each time, to a singular explication du 
texte, and in so doing crosses the line the law has drawn in order to give to the text a governed 
identity. This has always been the case, as Michel Foucault has had occasion to observe in a 
different context, on the history of authorship: ‘it was at the moment when a system of 
ownership and strict copyright rules were established … that the transgressive properties always 
intrinsic to the act of writing become the forceful imperative of literature’ (1979, 124-25). 
 Now, while in citing Foucault, I have shifted from reflections on what takes place 
intrinsically in writing to the ‘external’ and material conditions of authorship and the role of 
writing as a system of production within a legal system, one cannot separate the internal from 
the external, particularly apropos the subject of the literary text. There is to be observed 
between Stewart or Barthes’ comments and those of Foucault a motion or passage from ‘inside’ 
to ‘outside’, as it were. Transgression and authority are intimately entwined then at different 
levels, from discourse to practice, one making the conditions for the generation of the other. 
To take but one example of literary production that bears out the more general assertion, the 
novel, Tony Tanner has commented in his study of adultery in the novel that, ‘[t]he novel, in 
its origin, might almost be said to be a transgressive mode, inasmuch as it seemed to break, or 
mix, or adulterate the existing genre-expectations of the time’ (Tanner 1979, 3). The reciprocal 
relation is less one of antagonism than of mutual dependency, for, historically speaking, no 
system or institution can survive without adaptation. The institutions of literature and 
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authorship constrain and contain textual production, and the subject matter of production 
exceeds what is authorised. In order to maintain themselves, the institutions adapt, taking in 
just enough of what is transgressive to preserve themselves, needing the very transgressions—or 
some—which they proscribe. Thus, transgression becomes the norm, making way in having 
been accommodated, for other transgressions. This potentially endless process is further 
complicated because in the modern era literature has the right to say whatever it wishes in its 
own ways, without censorship or interdiction. The very system of literature is predicated then 
on its being an open and auto-transgressive system, a mutable or protean identity that is always 
already hetero-normative. In being transgressive, the literary is a parasitical organism, an 
exogenous entity transgressing the boundaries of countless discourses and systems, and 
cannibalizing their resources. 
 ‘Transgression’, writes Chris Jenks in his study of the subject, in which he addresses, 
amongst others, Bataille, the Marquis de Sade, Freud and the concept of taboo, Nietzsche and 
morality, Artaud, Rimbaud, Bakhtin, Dada and Surrealism, ‘is that which exceeds boundaries 
or exceeds limits’ (2000, 7). This echoes what we have already affirmed, earlier in this 
introduction. However, he cautions, ‘we need to affirm that human experience is the constant 
experience of limits, perhaps because of the absolute finitude of death… Constraint is a 
constant experience in our action, it needs to be to render us social’ (7). As he continues, 
constraint is never imposed solely from outside ourselves. Rather we limit ourselves regarding 
our behaviour. Or at least we believe we do. For it is the case that the ways in which we regulate 
our actions, believing that we act on the limits within which we live (or not), are not natural. 
There is not some ‘Law of Nature’ that we transgress as John Locke believed, which Law is 
translated into institutional secular and religious forms by those who rule us. Regulations and 
the systems to which they belong are cultural and historical manifestations which we learn, and 
21 
which we impose, for the most part, to greater or lesser degrees, on ourselves. Each of us is 
produced as our own policeman—or policewoman. Literary texts repeatedly mediate this 
duality, the outside system become internal measure or, as Jenks has it ‘[t]ransgression is part of 
the social process, [but] it is part of the individual psyche’ (2000, 186).  
Thus, the novel, plays or films seek to work through the paradox that one transgresses 
because one’s survival is threatened by what, to many, is convention or normative behaviour. 
Without the transgression deemed to be out of bounds or beyond the pale (to recall the spatial 
motion and the topography inhabited by the transgressing self), the self will disappear. Art in 
its many guises invites the reader, occupying a safe space (a gallery, a theatre, the rooms at 
home in which one reads), to look at ‘the precarious edges of experience, where oppressions 
meanings are negotiated and sometimes reconstructed’ (Palmer 2000, 453), whether those 
oppressions are, generally, the past (tradition, heritage, history) as inherited weight the stifles 
subjectivity and authenticity, the institutions of the present, or the limits to experience I 
negotiate as ‘my own’. One manifestation of transgression in nineteenth-century literature, 
lying, offers a form of preservation of the otherwise ‘honest’ self, until the subject who lies is 
reconciled with, the society, by which he or she has become marginalized as John Kucich has 
demonstrated extensively (1994).  
Literature and other forms of aesthetic text might then be understood as transgressively 
affirmative or, otherwise, as so many ‘aporias of resistance’ (to borrow Elisabeth Bronfen’s fine 
phrase; 1992, 395), and in the following double manner. Internally, narratives in which 
transgression takes place beyond the obvious criminality and illicit trajectory, foreground the 
limits of social logic by unveiling the mechanisms of survival by which characters, normally 
‘moral’, are forced to survive by becoming ‘outlaws’ because of social inflexibility. The paradox 
within social systems that produces the strategic illicit action opens the potential for reform 
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and transformation. Externally, there is the relation between the text and its reader, or 
audience.  Whilst I police myself, my minor transgressions and excesses all too common, too 
quotidian, imaginary spaces, those forms of phantasmic embodiment we call textual or literary, 
allow me another kind of transgression. I can get ‘outside’ myself, as it were. I can exceed my 
being and my world, crossing over the boundary from reality to the invented world, and 
experience by proxy the events of another. These events or experiences need not be of the 
‘obvious’ variety. It is not a question of anything as trivial or banal as reading about serial 
killers, monsters, drug addicts, and so on. The transgression is in the imagined step beyond the 
self into any other life, losing the self in other possibilities. Such action may well be purely 
pleasurable, but often the texts in question are written from a need to explore, and at the same 
time to remain within the law. As we shall see, literature opens one to the encounter with 
countless others, but gives transgressive access beyond repetition of the law to inventions of the 
national self, to translations of the subject through displacement and disorientation as a result 
of physical and geographical location, and to experiences involving an interrogation of the very 
means by which one’s identity is placed within cultures, societies and traditions.  
In conclusion, then, transgression does not break absolutely with this placement. 
Rather it indicates a moment of becoming, an event erupting from out of a multiplicity of 
possibilities in the textual and cultural formation of knowledge where transition is irreversible. 
Transgression takes place, where it takes place, as a ‘foundational interruption’ (Badiou 2005, 
81). Understanding this, by the way, and taking on board the full measure of its implications, I 
end with an examination of ghostly inheritance. To put this another way, the volume 
concludes with particular transgressions of the self, given the names of ‘anxiety’, an anxiety 
concerning the influence of the past—and therefore staged through the imagined subject 
finding him- or herself transgressed temporally—on any present moment of articulation; and 
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‘love’, this singular example of transgression being understood spatially, as that which arrives 
from some other place and some other subject. These are expressed most succinctly in the work 
of Harold Bloom and in the philosophy and literary criticism of Giorgio Agamben. Both 
critics’ work, though often incommensurably different, is nonetheless structured around a 
response to reading foundational interruptions in the constitution of the subject. One breaks a 
contract which then, in response, reforms, to maintain the production of historical knowledge, 
consciousness, and meaning in discourse. The transgressive as movement sends out for reading a 
proposition submitted, as Jacques Derrida would have it of the Hegelian text, ‘an interpretive 
decision’ as the imperative of all ‘logical continuity’ (1978, 260). In this move, Derrida 
inaugurates a reading of the transgressive in Bataille qua negativity and affirmation 
simultaneously. (Which of course is an a mode of ‘originary transgression’, if you will, for at 
the very heart of transgression is the transgression of ontology or meaning that makes possible 
the impossible simultaneity just signalled.) Discourse is thus opened within itself to a loss. It 
finds itself opened by a negativity within its own conditions of representation—and in this we 
come to read the foundational interruption and the affirmative event. Put another way 
discourse transgresses itself—but only, as Derrida insists, on the very condition that ‘this 
transgression of discourse’, and as he remarks parenthetically, ‘consequently of law in general’, 
must ‘in some fashion…conserve or confirm that which hit exceeds. This is the only way for it 
to affirm itself as transgression and thereby to acceed’ (1978, 274) to whichever law, whichever 
order or continuum, whichever historical, material or metaphysical ‘truth’ is presented through 
the violence of the provisional rupture and passage. When cultural ‘truth’ or meaning is made 
nonsensical through a revelation concerning the logical limits of any law or system of 
representation then ‘the world of meaning’ is linked to ‘the world of nonmeaning’ (1978, 275) 
and violence, destruction, negative force ensue so as to claim a becoming of identity and being 
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that gestures towards the future through its ‘transgressive affirmation’  (1978, 274). Such 
transgressive affirmation and, reciprocally, any affirmative transgression is, we may reflect as we 
bring this introduction to a close, to be encountered in the reader’s experience of the image 
and text. Texts are discursively promiscuous, often despite themselves or their authors. In the 
image, the trope, and other figures of the text irreducible to semantic stability, meaning is not 
upheld. Rather there occurs an ‘affective resonance’ (Cable 1995, 9) as unlooked-for authoring 
of the self emerging from an encounter, an intersection—here, in short, the motive, motif, and 
motivation beyond the conventional, the commonplace, the obvious, all those mystified 
dimensions of our social selves by which we are surrounded.  
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Notes 
 
 
i The line before this footnote is, more or less, a citation. It is not in quotation marks and there 
is no page number, because it comes, more or less, from an anonymous commentary on the 
present project at a draft stage. I cite it for the purpose of illuminating my argument 
concerning the reading of transgression, rather than because I think the impulse behind it 
necessarily inaccurate. A number of that reader’s comments are urgently pertinent to the 
thinking of a project such as this, and revisions, emendations, and new passages have been 
included, both in this introduction and elsewhere throughout the book as a result, for which 
impetus I thank the anonymous reader. 
ii The reader mentioned above uses the term ‘wire-drawn’ in her evaluation, and again I thank 
her for introducing this word to me. The definition I have given is the earliest, taken from the 
OED, which cites. Whilst writers as different as Ben Jonson, Thomas Carlyle, and Thomas 
Hardy use the word if not wholly positively, then certainly with an ironic ambiguity, the reader 
seems to use it more as a nonce-word meaning ‘thin’ and ‘weak’. I also draw the phrase ‘more 
or less’ from the reader’s comments.  
